I’ve given a good deal of thought lately to the creation of the Universe, most pertinently to the question of whether or not God literally created in six days. It’s a question that has always interested me, and I thought today I would briefly lay out a few ideas I have formed, perhaps foolishly, without much study. So I welcome any challenge or rebuke.
First of all, I cheerfully confess that I firmly hold to the idea of a six-day creation, for the simple reason that I have never seen any convincing reason not to. As a theist, and more importantly as a Christian, there is no reason for me to discredit the concept because it does not coincide with an unproven theory held by men. If God is God, why could He not create in six days as described? Is not the Bible full of descriptions of His omnipotence, of how His foolishness is wiser than man’s wisdom? Now this is a whole other essay in itself, but one which I am not here to write. In essence, however, let it be said I remain to be convinced of a good reason to dismiss the creation story in Genesis out of hand.
This does not mean that I necessarily believe the narrative is meant to be taken as absolutely literal. After all, no description of God’s works can ever be literal, because our finite understanding and languages could not contain it. The Bible speaks of God’s hands, of his back, of his wrath, and of his laughter. We all know that none of these descriptions are meant literally, but most of us at least accept that what these analogous terms are used to describe did and do actually occur. We know Moses did not literally view God’s back, but we do know that he was given an extremely small glimpse of His glory. We know God, being a spirit, could not physically laugh, but we know that have some perception of what we call humor. Likewise we know that, as a spirit, He is not technically male, but we know that His true nature is best and most accurately expressed in masculine terms. Consequently, I think there is no danger in assuming that the days described in Genesis 1 could not have been days as we understand them, i.e., as complete rotations of the earth, as the sun and stars were not created until the fourth of these days. Personally, however, I am not willing to go so far as to try to assert what exactly these days were. We are not told, and obviously we do not need to know (just as we do not need to know exactly what Moses saw, or exactly how God wrote the Decalogue on stone tablets). Nor does it seem sensible to try to reconcile this with modern theories of macroevolution by concluding that the days were actually ages of millions or billions of years. It hardly seems likely that plants would be able to thrive for millions of years without sunlight (unless one were willing to accept a miracle, which is hardly incompatible with the idea, but usually counterproductive to the reason for assuming it, in my experience, at least).
It’s unfortunate that this issue is often characterized as a simplistic battle between those who take the account as literal to the letter, and those who dismiss the whole thing out of hand. The Bible is not simplistic, and it cannot be read with a simplistic mindset if it is to be understood. We do not read other books with the assumption either that everything in it must be literally true or else the whole thing is complete rubbish. To claim something is inerrant is not essentially the same thing as to claim that everything in it is literally true. To assert that what the Bible actually states about the world’s creation is true is not the same as to assert that all of those statements are made in literal terms. And in the debate over exactly how much is literal and how much is not, the truths conveyed by the narrative as written (which would remain even if the account were purely metaphorical) are often overlooked. Not that the other issues are unimportant or irrelevant. On the contrary, the account must be either factually true or factually false, literal or metaphorical, or some combination of the latter two. The quest for truth should not consider any matter too small for its notice. On the other hand, the question of literality, however important, is not vitally important. What is vitally important is that the Universe is the creation solely of God, wrought ex nihilo by His power alone. Whether the sun was created 24 hours or 24 billion years after trees is indeed important, but it is less important than the truth that it is God, and not the sun, who brought plants into existence and sustains their existence, and that the sun is merely an instrument that He could do without if He had so chosen.
Again I must stress that that vitally important is not the same thing as solely important. I would be the last person to claim that as long as we believe the essentials, nothing else really matters. And you already know what I believe about this question, in open opposition to the majority who believe otherwise. But on the other hand, in our debates about things of (if you will pardon an imperfect expression) secondary importance, we must not lose sight of those things of primary importance. However literally the account of Genesis 1 is meant to be taken, we should not overlook the fact that its central theme is the sovereignty and omnipotence of God as the Creator, which is expressed just as powerfully and truly whether it is literal or metaphorical history.
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Sunday, June 14, 2009
The Bones of an Argument
For one of my school assignments of this past year I chose to address a letter to Richard Dawkins in response to the first chapter of The God Delusion (accessible here). Though I am in many ways dissatisfied with it at present, I post it here, chiefly because it contains the skeleton of a more thought-out and developed argument that I hope to make in future posts.
Mr. Dawkins,
The excerpt from the first chapter of your book was, to say the least, a fascinating insight into your particular conception both of theism and atheism. Although you demonstrate an ability to make your arguments clearly and engagingly, unfortunately your logical incoherence is so pervasive that it makes all your compositional skill seem rather fruitless.
Your primary fault lies in your inability to come to grips with what you have created. You weave a picture of a world that consists of but one element, matter, and yet you seem unable to function within that world. You can scarcely make an argument in support of your world of matter without borrowing immaterial concepts that have no place within it.
You speak of “transcendent wonder,” and enthusiastically quote Carl Sagan’s notion that the physical universe itself should draw “reverence and awe.” It seems that the physical universe should draw from us a sort of worship such as most theists feel for their theos of choice. You write:
“Human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in this sense of philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles — except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don't yet understand. If there is something that appears to lie beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, we hope eventually to understand it and embrace it within the natural. As ever when we unweave a rainbow, it will not become less wonderful.”
Here you seek to refute the common argument that to eliminate God is to eliminate our sense of awe at the universe. That you even feel the need to argue for this is telling. What is awe but a series of “complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain?” If that is all it is, why do you feel the compulsion to assure us that it will not be lost when we come to see the world as you do? Is it simply because it makes us feel good? This cannot be it, for you speak as though reverence for the universe is a kind of necessary and obligatory response. But why should one physical entity respond to another in such a way when there is no scientific law dictating it? If it were a scientific law that the assembly of physical entities that we call our minds had to react in such a way as to produce the sensations we call awe and reverence when exposed to the proper physical elements, then there is no need to convince me that it will occur. It simply will, or it will not.
In other words, if I believe that there is a God, it is nothing more than the result of the particular physical entities of my brain having been exposed to the precise physical elements that provoke the reaction that we describe as “belief in God.” That your brain has undergone a different series of mental actions is no cause for you to try to force my brain to undergo those same actions, anymore than I have a right to demand that my friend who is five-foot-two should increase her height to equal mine. Thought is no less a physical thing than growth, according to you. Since you are so concerned with reason and rationality, perhaps you could explain, logically, where you get the idea that it is appropriate to seek to rectify certain physical situations and not others.
I expect you might say that the physical condition that we describe as belief in God is equitable to a disease, because it does so much harm and endangers the species. And yet you would probably also argue that we who have this physical condition are fully unaware that it is a disease, and that we cannot see the ill effects of it. I certainly know that such a description would apply to me. But is it not just as possible that the disease is yours, and that you are as unaware as you think we are? By what standard, apart from the physical collection of entities known as your mind, which is subject to precisely the same physical laws as my own, do you presume to judge yourself the healthy one? And this does not even broach the matter that from my side of the spectrum I can see a multitude of dangers to the species that arise from your physical condition known as atheism; and I would wager you would either fail to see them altogether or deny that they are dangers. Likewise it does not delve into the question of why the species is inherently worth preserving from danger given the amount of damage it has done to the universe as a whole.
With all this said, what ground do you have to stand on from which you can condemn “moral and intellectual cowardice?” Is not that thing we call cowardice simply a physical reaction, the most basic of self-preservation instincts brought on by the conjunction of certain chemicals within the “mind,” as we call it? Is it not simply a physical thing, a very part of the Great Universe that you expect us to bow down to in reverence? Should we not accord cowardice the same reverence we accord courage?
Subject to that chemical reaction within the physical matter of the brain that we call “sincerity,”
~David Maxwell
Mr. Dawkins,
The excerpt from the first chapter of your book was, to say the least, a fascinating insight into your particular conception both of theism and atheism. Although you demonstrate an ability to make your arguments clearly and engagingly, unfortunately your logical incoherence is so pervasive that it makes all your compositional skill seem rather fruitless.
Your primary fault lies in your inability to come to grips with what you have created. You weave a picture of a world that consists of but one element, matter, and yet you seem unable to function within that world. You can scarcely make an argument in support of your world of matter without borrowing immaterial concepts that have no place within it.
You speak of “transcendent wonder,” and enthusiastically quote Carl Sagan’s notion that the physical universe itself should draw “reverence and awe.” It seems that the physical universe should draw from us a sort of worship such as most theists feel for their theos of choice. You write:
“Human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in this sense of philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles — except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don't yet understand. If there is something that appears to lie beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, we hope eventually to understand it and embrace it within the natural. As ever when we unweave a rainbow, it will not become less wonderful.”
Here you seek to refute the common argument that to eliminate God is to eliminate our sense of awe at the universe. That you even feel the need to argue for this is telling. What is awe but a series of “complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain?” If that is all it is, why do you feel the compulsion to assure us that it will not be lost when we come to see the world as you do? Is it simply because it makes us feel good? This cannot be it, for you speak as though reverence for the universe is a kind of necessary and obligatory response. But why should one physical entity respond to another in such a way when there is no scientific law dictating it? If it were a scientific law that the assembly of physical entities that we call our minds had to react in such a way as to produce the sensations we call awe and reverence when exposed to the proper physical elements, then there is no need to convince me that it will occur. It simply will, or it will not.
In other words, if I believe that there is a God, it is nothing more than the result of the particular physical entities of my brain having been exposed to the precise physical elements that provoke the reaction that we describe as “belief in God.” That your brain has undergone a different series of mental actions is no cause for you to try to force my brain to undergo those same actions, anymore than I have a right to demand that my friend who is five-foot-two should increase her height to equal mine. Thought is no less a physical thing than growth, according to you. Since you are so concerned with reason and rationality, perhaps you could explain, logically, where you get the idea that it is appropriate to seek to rectify certain physical situations and not others.
I expect you might say that the physical condition that we describe as belief in God is equitable to a disease, because it does so much harm and endangers the species. And yet you would probably also argue that we who have this physical condition are fully unaware that it is a disease, and that we cannot see the ill effects of it. I certainly know that such a description would apply to me. But is it not just as possible that the disease is yours, and that you are as unaware as you think we are? By what standard, apart from the physical collection of entities known as your mind, which is subject to precisely the same physical laws as my own, do you presume to judge yourself the healthy one? And this does not even broach the matter that from my side of the spectrum I can see a multitude of dangers to the species that arise from your physical condition known as atheism; and I would wager you would either fail to see them altogether or deny that they are dangers. Likewise it does not delve into the question of why the species is inherently worth preserving from danger given the amount of damage it has done to the universe as a whole.
With all this said, what ground do you have to stand on from which you can condemn “moral and intellectual cowardice?” Is not that thing we call cowardice simply a physical reaction, the most basic of self-preservation instincts brought on by the conjunction of certain chemicals within the “mind,” as we call it? Is it not simply a physical thing, a very part of the Great Universe that you expect us to bow down to in reverence? Should we not accord cowardice the same reverence we accord courage?
Subject to that chemical reaction within the physical matter of the brain that we call “sincerity,”
~David Maxwell
Sunday, May 17, 2009
A Famous Argument Answered
A friend of mine recently asserted that the so-called “Lord, liar, or lunatic” argument was flawed. Naturally it got me to thinking, not only about this argument, but about others that Christians commonly use to refute false claims about Christ and the Gospel. The argument is flawed, not only because is it substantially unsound—which it is—but also because it rests on an impossible concept.
But first things first. One often hears it argued that, given His many assertions of divinity, Jesus must have been either a madman, a blasphemous liar, or the Son of God as He claimed. It is most commonly leveled at those who wish to claim that Jesus was a very good and wise man, but not the Logos incarnate, the Son of God, the one and only path to salvation. While I must commend the intent behind this—a desire to undercut any kind of fence-sitting, boneless Christianity—I cannot agree with it. While madness, deceit, and truth are the three most likely possibilities for someone who claimed to be God, they are not the only possibilities. We cannot exclude the very real possibility of error. Now you might be thinking that believing yourself to be divine is not just any old error, and in that you would be right. It’s not the same kind of error as thinking Afghanistan is west of Iran just because you’ve never seen a map. But it is not an error that is truly impossible to make without forfeiting your sanity, unless we take the definition of insanity to absurd lengths.
Insanity is popularly spoken of as if it were a loss of reason, but Chesterton rather astutely pointed out that it is the loss of everything but reason, the loss of the ability to base one’s reasoning process on reality. In other words, an insane man is one whose rational mind works almost entirely from false premises. The ability to move from premises to conclusion is as functioning as ever. Now we do not claim everyone who believes and reasons from errors to be insane. I have seen a perfectly sane man assert and reason from a belief that the foundation of the Anglican Church (c.1530 AD) predated Henry II of England (1133-1189 AD). I know of an otherwise reasonable person who will not drive down a street if it is crossed by a black cat. Neither person is insane, so far as anyone can tell, but both reason and act from premises that have no grounding in reality. Granted neither of these errors is as large or as important as believing oneself divine. But I wish only to raise the question of what kind of error constitutes insanity, and what kind constitutes mere ignorance or superstition? A possible answer might be that insanity occurs with an error that cannot possibly have come from one’s real observations or lack thereof, but only from the fabrications of one’s own mind, and when they affect one’s whole mode of life. That might be so (still it is a hard line to draw), but I propose that a sincere claim to divinity does not require a person to be insane or out of touch with the real world in any way.
Allow me to propose one plausible example. The Hebrews had known for hundreds of years that a Messiah would be born to them from the lineage of David. Is it not therefore possible that a Hebrew man and his wife of that line might (because of a strange dream, or insanity on their part, or what have you) come to actually believe that their son was the Messiah? If so, naturally they would train that son to believe it for himself; probably they would name him Joshua. In such a situation, our hypothetical Joshua could say from a position of complete conviction, complete sanity, and complete error, that he was the anointed savior of Israel. Now this particular explanation does not account for certain factors such as the Virgin Birth, nor does it necessarily lead to a claim of divinity, but both of those things could quite easily be supplied by imaginative (or deceitful) parents. I will add, though I hardly think it necessary, that there is not a grain of doubt in my mind that the Jesus of the Gospels was indeed the Christ. I am not trying to introduce any reason to doubt Him. All I am arguing is that the argument for exclusively three possibilities is not quite sound. The situation I have given is, I freely admit, one very unlikely to have occurred to anyone. But as long as it is metaphysically plausible, then the argument cannot stand.
In case anyone wishes to raise the point, the miracles are irrelevant to this particular argument. Obviously, in the hypothetical situation described, miracles would not have occurred. But since we’re dealing with an argument used against those who doubt Christ’s divinity (and consequently the miracles) anyway, what we would have to make of them if we believed this scenario is beyond the scope of this essay.
But my primary reason for disliking the argument is not, surprising as it may sound, because it is inherently unsound. What bothers me about this and other arguments trying to rationally corner unbelievers is simply that they defeat their own purpose. Once the veracity of the Bible and the reality of God become matters to be proven, then the assumption is made that there is something higher than God to which He can be subjected. It reduces Him to a natural phenomenon to be codified and studied. But we cannot reason our way to God, if He is God, we cannot step outside of him to look at him with some “objective, rational” viewpoint. We are His creatures, living in His creation, deriving our very being and nature from Him. If I may say it without being misunderstood, we are outpourings of Him. It is ludicrous, indeed laughable, to assume that we can encompass Him with our little nets of rationality when we cannot even step back from Him far enough to make out His complete outline. When the knowledge of God is degenerated to scientific knowledge, it is reduced just like atheism to an inevitable circle, trying to prove the Logos with logic, which is no valid proof at all. Anything that relies solely on rationality will eventually reveal itself as a giant circle, Christianity included. That it is true does not exclude it from this principle, as some who have a limited notion of truth would seem to believe. For our Faith is what we reason from; it is too high for us to reason to.
But first things first. One often hears it argued that, given His many assertions of divinity, Jesus must have been either a madman, a blasphemous liar, or the Son of God as He claimed. It is most commonly leveled at those who wish to claim that Jesus was a very good and wise man, but not the Logos incarnate, the Son of God, the one and only path to salvation. While I must commend the intent behind this—a desire to undercut any kind of fence-sitting, boneless Christianity—I cannot agree with it. While madness, deceit, and truth are the three most likely possibilities for someone who claimed to be God, they are not the only possibilities. We cannot exclude the very real possibility of error. Now you might be thinking that believing yourself to be divine is not just any old error, and in that you would be right. It’s not the same kind of error as thinking Afghanistan is west of Iran just because you’ve never seen a map. But it is not an error that is truly impossible to make without forfeiting your sanity, unless we take the definition of insanity to absurd lengths.
Insanity is popularly spoken of as if it were a loss of reason, but Chesterton rather astutely pointed out that it is the loss of everything but reason, the loss of the ability to base one’s reasoning process on reality. In other words, an insane man is one whose rational mind works almost entirely from false premises. The ability to move from premises to conclusion is as functioning as ever. Now we do not claim everyone who believes and reasons from errors to be insane. I have seen a perfectly sane man assert and reason from a belief that the foundation of the Anglican Church (c.1530 AD) predated Henry II of England (1133-1189 AD). I know of an otherwise reasonable person who will not drive down a street if it is crossed by a black cat. Neither person is insane, so far as anyone can tell, but both reason and act from premises that have no grounding in reality. Granted neither of these errors is as large or as important as believing oneself divine. But I wish only to raise the question of what kind of error constitutes insanity, and what kind constitutes mere ignorance or superstition? A possible answer might be that insanity occurs with an error that cannot possibly have come from one’s real observations or lack thereof, but only from the fabrications of one’s own mind, and when they affect one’s whole mode of life. That might be so (still it is a hard line to draw), but I propose that a sincere claim to divinity does not require a person to be insane or out of touch with the real world in any way.
Allow me to propose one plausible example. The Hebrews had known for hundreds of years that a Messiah would be born to them from the lineage of David. Is it not therefore possible that a Hebrew man and his wife of that line might (because of a strange dream, or insanity on their part, or what have you) come to actually believe that their son was the Messiah? If so, naturally they would train that son to believe it for himself; probably they would name him Joshua. In such a situation, our hypothetical Joshua could say from a position of complete conviction, complete sanity, and complete error, that he was the anointed savior of Israel. Now this particular explanation does not account for certain factors such as the Virgin Birth, nor does it necessarily lead to a claim of divinity, but both of those things could quite easily be supplied by imaginative (or deceitful) parents. I will add, though I hardly think it necessary, that there is not a grain of doubt in my mind that the Jesus of the Gospels was indeed the Christ. I am not trying to introduce any reason to doubt Him. All I am arguing is that the argument for exclusively three possibilities is not quite sound. The situation I have given is, I freely admit, one very unlikely to have occurred to anyone. But as long as it is metaphysically plausible, then the argument cannot stand.
In case anyone wishes to raise the point, the miracles are irrelevant to this particular argument. Obviously, in the hypothetical situation described, miracles would not have occurred. But since we’re dealing with an argument used against those who doubt Christ’s divinity (and consequently the miracles) anyway, what we would have to make of them if we believed this scenario is beyond the scope of this essay.
But my primary reason for disliking the argument is not, surprising as it may sound, because it is inherently unsound. What bothers me about this and other arguments trying to rationally corner unbelievers is simply that they defeat their own purpose. Once the veracity of the Bible and the reality of God become matters to be proven, then the assumption is made that there is something higher than God to which He can be subjected. It reduces Him to a natural phenomenon to be codified and studied. But we cannot reason our way to God, if He is God, we cannot step outside of him to look at him with some “objective, rational” viewpoint. We are His creatures, living in His creation, deriving our very being and nature from Him. If I may say it without being misunderstood, we are outpourings of Him. It is ludicrous, indeed laughable, to assume that we can encompass Him with our little nets of rationality when we cannot even step back from Him far enough to make out His complete outline. When the knowledge of God is degenerated to scientific knowledge, it is reduced just like atheism to an inevitable circle, trying to prove the Logos with logic, which is no valid proof at all. Anything that relies solely on rationality will eventually reveal itself as a giant circle, Christianity included. That it is true does not exclude it from this principle, as some who have a limited notion of truth would seem to believe. For our Faith is what we reason from; it is too high for us to reason to.
Sunday, May 3, 2009
Cain and Abel: Occupational Differences
Cain, the new man and heir of the second account, appears to be following the life God foretold for man outside the garden. Perhaps, like many a firstborn he takes over the family business, whether out of duty, ambition, or the desire to please—or displace—his father; alternatively, as the human prototype, he may be the first farmer, the first to take up the announced or prescribed human work. In either case, one might think farmer Cain obedient. But as Robert Sacks observes, “The only disturbing thing is his name. It implies that, for Cain to be a farmer means to put up fences and to establish a private tract of land which one can call one’s own rather than fulfilling one’s duty to the fruitfulness of the earth. Abel’s way of life leaves the world open. Shepherds need no fences and roam through the whole.” Yet the difference is greater still.
Farming requires intellectual sophistication and psychic discipline: wit is necessary to foresee the possibility of bread from grain, to develop tools, to protect crops; self-control—indeed, a massive change n the psychodynamics of need and satisfaction—is needed before anyone will work today so that he might eat months later. In addition, agriculture comes with a new relation to the earth (and also toward the heavens): farming means possession of land and settled habitation; it represents a giant step toward human self-sufficiency, yet it is also precarious and very dependent on rain. Because he mixes his labor with the earth, the farmer claims possession not only to the crops but also to the land itself. For the same reason, he is even inclined to regard himself as responsible—creatively as maker—for the produce itself. On this view, the farmer is an audacious and self-assertive character.
The shepherd, in contrast, lives a simple and by and large artless life. His work is mild and gentle, his rule requires no violence. The sheep graze as they roam and produce wool and milk out of their own substance, the shepherd contributing noting but also harming nothing. Though he wanders the earth as he pleases the shepherd has no illusions of self-sufficiency; indeed, he is likely to feel acutely the dependence of his entire life on powers not under his control and processes not of his own creation. The settled farmer seeks to design his life, the wandering shepherd allows his life to be designed by the world.
In sum, on this understanding of the two occupations, Cain’s way of life, like the man, is more complex: possessive, artful, potentially harmful, and dangerous, but with the prospect of the higher achievements (and risks) of civilization. Abel’s way, like the man, is simple: open and permissive, harmless, and certainly vulnerable (especially before craft, cunning, and technique) and, besides, incapable of accomplishing much of anything. Abel’s way is fragile, not to say impossible; Cain’s was is problematic, not to say indecent—unless it can be educated and restrained…
…Rather than serving God, farmers are in danger of serving the earth as if it were a divinity; they are at risk of becoming slaves to the earth. It is not just that they are at risk of becoming slaves t the earth. It is not just that they are at the mercy of the elements, on the heavenly rain from the skies above and the maternal fruitfulness of the soil below. The farmer is bound to his plot, rooted in place just like his crops, not free to leave not free to escape the grip of necessity by which the cursed ground holds him fast, as it were, by the throat.
In contrast, on this interpretation, the shepherd is the true innovator. Having the example of the farmer before him (his older brother), he refuses to live in thrall to the cursed earth, tilling it, serving it, and looking to it for salvation. Rather than submit to dumb nature in the form of Mother Earth, the shepherd breaks away from the bondage of farming and rises up to exercise rule over the animals. He somehow intuits that it is in this way that he acts as a human being made in the image of the true God…Rather than seeing the world in terms of master and slaves, he sees the importance of reasoned order and authority, all in the interest of the ruled. A leader and ruler himself, yet feeling his dependence on powers aloft, he may be more open to the need for leadership in his own life.
~The Beginning of Wisdom, Leon Kass
Farming requires intellectual sophistication and psychic discipline: wit is necessary to foresee the possibility of bread from grain, to develop tools, to protect crops; self-control—indeed, a massive change n the psychodynamics of need and satisfaction—is needed before anyone will work today so that he might eat months later. In addition, agriculture comes with a new relation to the earth (and also toward the heavens): farming means possession of land and settled habitation; it represents a giant step toward human self-sufficiency, yet it is also precarious and very dependent on rain. Because he mixes his labor with the earth, the farmer claims possession not only to the crops but also to the land itself. For the same reason, he is even inclined to regard himself as responsible—creatively as maker—for the produce itself. On this view, the farmer is an audacious and self-assertive character.
The shepherd, in contrast, lives a simple and by and large artless life. His work is mild and gentle, his rule requires no violence. The sheep graze as they roam and produce wool and milk out of their own substance, the shepherd contributing noting but also harming nothing. Though he wanders the earth as he pleases the shepherd has no illusions of self-sufficiency; indeed, he is likely to feel acutely the dependence of his entire life on powers not under his control and processes not of his own creation. The settled farmer seeks to design his life, the wandering shepherd allows his life to be designed by the world.
In sum, on this understanding of the two occupations, Cain’s way of life, like the man, is more complex: possessive, artful, potentially harmful, and dangerous, but with the prospect of the higher achievements (and risks) of civilization. Abel’s way, like the man, is simple: open and permissive, harmless, and certainly vulnerable (especially before craft, cunning, and technique) and, besides, incapable of accomplishing much of anything. Abel’s way is fragile, not to say impossible; Cain’s was is problematic, not to say indecent—unless it can be educated and restrained…
…Rather than serving God, farmers are in danger of serving the earth as if it were a divinity; they are at risk of becoming slaves to the earth. It is not just that they are at risk of becoming slaves t the earth. It is not just that they are at the mercy of the elements, on the heavenly rain from the skies above and the maternal fruitfulness of the soil below. The farmer is bound to his plot, rooted in place just like his crops, not free to leave not free to escape the grip of necessity by which the cursed ground holds him fast, as it were, by the throat.
In contrast, on this interpretation, the shepherd is the true innovator. Having the example of the farmer before him (his older brother), he refuses to live in thrall to the cursed earth, tilling it, serving it, and looking to it for salvation. Rather than submit to dumb nature in the form of Mother Earth, the shepherd breaks away from the bondage of farming and rises up to exercise rule over the animals. He somehow intuits that it is in this way that he acts as a human being made in the image of the true God…Rather than seeing the world in terms of master and slaves, he sees the importance of reasoned order and authority, all in the interest of the ruled. A leader and ruler himself, yet feeling his dependence on powers aloft, he may be more open to the need for leadership in his own life.
~The Beginning of Wisdom, Leon Kass
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Christians and Violence: Article II
Whether it is ever lawful for Christians to engage in war or to do violence to another man?
It would seem that it is not lawful for Christians to engage in war or do violence to another.
Objection I. The Christian’s warfare is spiritual, not fleshly. To engage in physical war contradicts this most fundamental proposition. To assume that the Christian has any business, much less any obligation, to engage in the battles of earthly kingdoms is to assume that Christ’s Kingdom is earthly, not Heavenly, and should be furthered and defended by earthly means.
Objection II. Because foreign policy decisions are not the realm of the military, the soldier can never know whether or not he will be ordered to take part in an unjust war. Even if his superiors and government tell him the cause is just—as they invariably will—he himself cannot see enough of the picture to know whether or not he is preserving or violating justice by fighting the enemy.
Objection III. Further, it is questionable whether or not any sort of war or violence is justified even in self-defense. If it is evil to begin a war with another nation without cause, is it not returning evil for evil to respond by engaging in war?
Objection IV. Further, let us consider the example of the early Christians, who, though persecuted for centuries, did not commit violence either in a massive revolt to end their plight or as individuals to protect their own lives.
On the contrary, I answer that it is lawful for Christians to engage in war, and at times to do violence to others.
Why should a thing be lawful on a small scale and evil on a large one? Clearly Scripture teaches that it is lawful to take measures against robbers, murderers, and other individual criminals. As Calvin asks, why should it be lawful to stop and punish one criminal and yet be unlawful to stop and punish a whole nation or army of criminals? If your house is broken into and robbed, you take action against the robber. If your nation is invaded to be plundered and exploited, naturally you take action against the invader. The principle that allows us to remove a thief from our own house only logically permits us to remove an army of thieves from our national soil. The principle that demands us to kill a murderer only logically demands us to kill an army of murderers. Lest it be argued that this Old Testament principle no longer applies in these Last Days, only consider Paul’s words to the Romans concerning civil rulers. “But if ye do evil, be afraid. He beareth not the sword in vain, for he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath on him that doeth evil.” If this were speaking of anything less than direct and violent action against evildoers, why the warning to “be afraid?”
Second, it is undeniable that throughout the Bible there are references to spiritual warfare. Physical war and violence are incessantly used as analogies for the much fiercer spiritual conflict waged throughout the universe. Now, if war and violence are necessarily evil, then God through His many writers is likening a good action to an evil one. Can we find another example of this in Scripture? Is Sabbath-breaking, manstealing, housebreaking, fornicating, perjury, sorcery, or sodomy ever used as an analogy or metaphor to speak of righteousness? Certainly not. On the contrary, the analogies used to illustrate righteousness are things clearly good even apart from what they illustrate: planting, harvesting, house-building, marrying, washing, racing, eating, parenting, money-saving, fishing—and fighting. This argument, perhaps, does not prove the lawfulness of war, but it does leave those who argue against it with a touchy bit of explaining to do.
Answer to Obj. I Once again, spiritual warfare should not be taken to mean exclusively internal warfare. That Christ called His disciples to be fishers of men did not mean that they were no longer to be fishers of fish—nor even that the catching and eating of fish could not be used to the advancement of the Gospel. Fighting a spiritual war means expanding, rather than shrinking, the battleground. It means seeking to destroy wickedness wherever it is to be found, whether in our own hearts, in the hearts of our brothers and sisters, or in the heart of the enemy ruler who sends his army against you. These are all different fronts, and each requires a different tactic. We do not attack sin in ourselves the same way that we attack it in our friends and relations, and likewise we do not attack it in another nation in the same way that we attack it in others. But why should it be part of spiritual warfare to seek to end your own sins by prayer, faith and obedience, and to seek to end your brother’s sin by prayer and admonition, if it is not lawful to seek to end a rival nation’s sin with prayer and a rifle?
Answer to Obj. II. Because foreign policy decisions are not made by the military, and because a soldier cannot have a clear idea of the larger picture, he cannot be personally held responsible for the justice or injustice of a war. His responsibility is not to look after who his government decides to go to war with anymore than it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to look after what his government does with the money. His responsibility is only to do what he knows to be lawful in his particular section of the war. This is only logical, as scripture does not forbid Christians from serving in the military, even when the only military to serve in was that of Rome, who waged many an unjust war in its time. As Augustine argues, “if Christian discipline condemned all wars, when soldiers ask counsel as to the way of salvation, they would have been told to cast away their arms, and withdraw altogether from military service, Whereas it is said [Luke 3:14], Concuss no one, do injury to no one, be contented with your pay. Those whom orders to be contented with their pay he certainly does not forbid to serve.” From which we perforce conclude that command to do violence to no one does not mean to do no violence to the enemy in war.
Answer to Obj. III. Returning violence for violence is not necessarily the same thing as returning evil for evil, for violence and evil are not interchangeable terms. The violence of a nation defending its people from slaughter and pillage is not substantively the same as the violence of a nation attacking another to slaughter and pillage. To break into someone’s house to steal and perhaps murder is evil; to break into that man’s house with the same end in mind, endangering his family and property, would be returning evil for evil. To do violence to him to protect one’s property and family from evil is returning evil with good. For every command forbidding an action, there is necessarily a converse command forbidding inaction. So that while it is a sin to take action to end an innocent life unjustly, it is likewise a sin to take no action to save an innocent life.
Answer to Obj IV. The primitive Church did not, it is true, respond to the violence enacted upon it with more violence. But it must be remembered first that the Church as a whole is distinct from believers as individuals, with distinct (but not unrelated) responsibilities. Second, that the violence enacted upon Christians of that time was of a very particular kind that warranted a very particular response. On the first point, let it be noted that the Church as a body is forbidden to take up arms or to exercise other authorities that God gives with full license with approval to civil governments (and presumably to Christians managing them). Likewise, God gives the Church as a body privileges and duties that are withheld from Christians as individuals. The individual, for instance, clearly has a right to own property; the Church, however, has no territory. Christendom is not bound to any land (incidentally, if such a digression may be allowed, it was the blurring of the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical, rather than any doctrine of belligerence, that was the real cause of so much violence being attributed to the Church in the Middle Ages). Hence the use of violent force in self-defense is a privilege, and duty, given to the Christian individual that is not given to the Church. That it is unlawful for the Church to have arms and prisons doesn’t mean that it is unlawful for Christian individuals to incarcerate thieves at gunpoint. This explains, in part, why the Primitive Church did not rise up en masse.
But beyond that, to have revolted against the Roman authority would have done more harm than good to the cause of Christ. The Roman Empire sought to destroy Christianity on the grounds that it was not religio but rather superstitio, or worse, eversio—subversion. It was labeled a cult that engaged in all manner of profane, abominable, and unnatural practices, dangerous to society at large. Had Christians violently resisted their persecution, it would have only confirmed these lies in the eyes of the average Roman citizen who watched them devoured by lions or raped by bulls in the arenas. Their invincible courage and willingness to die, however, eventually won many awed heathens to Christ. Still, these believers were no more or less active in Christian warfare; they simply had, by the grace of God, strategic wisdom to recognize that mere physical violence, far from being excessively aggressive, would not be nearly aggressive enough.
It would seem that it is not lawful for Christians to engage in war or do violence to another.
Objection I. The Christian’s warfare is spiritual, not fleshly. To engage in physical war contradicts this most fundamental proposition. To assume that the Christian has any business, much less any obligation, to engage in the battles of earthly kingdoms is to assume that Christ’s Kingdom is earthly, not Heavenly, and should be furthered and defended by earthly means.
Objection II. Because foreign policy decisions are not the realm of the military, the soldier can never know whether or not he will be ordered to take part in an unjust war. Even if his superiors and government tell him the cause is just—as they invariably will—he himself cannot see enough of the picture to know whether or not he is preserving or violating justice by fighting the enemy.
Objection III. Further, it is questionable whether or not any sort of war or violence is justified even in self-defense. If it is evil to begin a war with another nation without cause, is it not returning evil for evil to respond by engaging in war?
Objection IV. Further, let us consider the example of the early Christians, who, though persecuted for centuries, did not commit violence either in a massive revolt to end their plight or as individuals to protect their own lives.
On the contrary, I answer that it is lawful for Christians to engage in war, and at times to do violence to others.
Why should a thing be lawful on a small scale and evil on a large one? Clearly Scripture teaches that it is lawful to take measures against robbers, murderers, and other individual criminals. As Calvin asks, why should it be lawful to stop and punish one criminal and yet be unlawful to stop and punish a whole nation or army of criminals? If your house is broken into and robbed, you take action against the robber. If your nation is invaded to be plundered and exploited, naturally you take action against the invader. The principle that allows us to remove a thief from our own house only logically permits us to remove an army of thieves from our national soil. The principle that demands us to kill a murderer only logically demands us to kill an army of murderers. Lest it be argued that this Old Testament principle no longer applies in these Last Days, only consider Paul’s words to the Romans concerning civil rulers. “But if ye do evil, be afraid. He beareth not the sword in vain, for he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath on him that doeth evil.” If this were speaking of anything less than direct and violent action against evildoers, why the warning to “be afraid?”
Second, it is undeniable that throughout the Bible there are references to spiritual warfare. Physical war and violence are incessantly used as analogies for the much fiercer spiritual conflict waged throughout the universe. Now, if war and violence are necessarily evil, then God through His many writers is likening a good action to an evil one. Can we find another example of this in Scripture? Is Sabbath-breaking, manstealing, housebreaking, fornicating, perjury, sorcery, or sodomy ever used as an analogy or metaphor to speak of righteousness? Certainly not. On the contrary, the analogies used to illustrate righteousness are things clearly good even apart from what they illustrate: planting, harvesting, house-building, marrying, washing, racing, eating, parenting, money-saving, fishing—and fighting. This argument, perhaps, does not prove the lawfulness of war, but it does leave those who argue against it with a touchy bit of explaining to do.
Answer to Obj. I Once again, spiritual warfare should not be taken to mean exclusively internal warfare. That Christ called His disciples to be fishers of men did not mean that they were no longer to be fishers of fish—nor even that the catching and eating of fish could not be used to the advancement of the Gospel. Fighting a spiritual war means expanding, rather than shrinking, the battleground. It means seeking to destroy wickedness wherever it is to be found, whether in our own hearts, in the hearts of our brothers and sisters, or in the heart of the enemy ruler who sends his army against you. These are all different fronts, and each requires a different tactic. We do not attack sin in ourselves the same way that we attack it in our friends and relations, and likewise we do not attack it in another nation in the same way that we attack it in others. But why should it be part of spiritual warfare to seek to end your own sins by prayer, faith and obedience, and to seek to end your brother’s sin by prayer and admonition, if it is not lawful to seek to end a rival nation’s sin with prayer and a rifle?
Answer to Obj. II. Because foreign policy decisions are not made by the military, and because a soldier cannot have a clear idea of the larger picture, he cannot be personally held responsible for the justice or injustice of a war. His responsibility is not to look after who his government decides to go to war with anymore than it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to look after what his government does with the money. His responsibility is only to do what he knows to be lawful in his particular section of the war. This is only logical, as scripture does not forbid Christians from serving in the military, even when the only military to serve in was that of Rome, who waged many an unjust war in its time. As Augustine argues, “if Christian discipline condemned all wars, when soldiers ask counsel as to the way of salvation, they would have been told to cast away their arms, and withdraw altogether from military service, Whereas it is said [Luke 3:14], Concuss no one, do injury to no one, be contented with your pay. Those whom orders to be contented with their pay he certainly does not forbid to serve.” From which we perforce conclude that command to do violence to no one does not mean to do no violence to the enemy in war.
Answer to Obj. III. Returning violence for violence is not necessarily the same thing as returning evil for evil, for violence and evil are not interchangeable terms. The violence of a nation defending its people from slaughter and pillage is not substantively the same as the violence of a nation attacking another to slaughter and pillage. To break into someone’s house to steal and perhaps murder is evil; to break into that man’s house with the same end in mind, endangering his family and property, would be returning evil for evil. To do violence to him to protect one’s property and family from evil is returning evil with good. For every command forbidding an action, there is necessarily a converse command forbidding inaction. So that while it is a sin to take action to end an innocent life unjustly, it is likewise a sin to take no action to save an innocent life.
Answer to Obj IV. The primitive Church did not, it is true, respond to the violence enacted upon it with more violence. But it must be remembered first that the Church as a whole is distinct from believers as individuals, with distinct (but not unrelated) responsibilities. Second, that the violence enacted upon Christians of that time was of a very particular kind that warranted a very particular response. On the first point, let it be noted that the Church as a body is forbidden to take up arms or to exercise other authorities that God gives with full license with approval to civil governments (and presumably to Christians managing them). Likewise, God gives the Church as a body privileges and duties that are withheld from Christians as individuals. The individual, for instance, clearly has a right to own property; the Church, however, has no territory. Christendom is not bound to any land (incidentally, if such a digression may be allowed, it was the blurring of the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical, rather than any doctrine of belligerence, that was the real cause of so much violence being attributed to the Church in the Middle Ages). Hence the use of violent force in self-defense is a privilege, and duty, given to the Christian individual that is not given to the Church. That it is unlawful for the Church to have arms and prisons doesn’t mean that it is unlawful for Christian individuals to incarcerate thieves at gunpoint. This explains, in part, why the Primitive Church did not rise up en masse.
But beyond that, to have revolted against the Roman authority would have done more harm than good to the cause of Christ. The Roman Empire sought to destroy Christianity on the grounds that it was not religio but rather superstitio, or worse, eversio—subversion. It was labeled a cult that engaged in all manner of profane, abominable, and unnatural practices, dangerous to society at large. Had Christians violently resisted their persecution, it would have only confirmed these lies in the eyes of the average Roman citizen who watched them devoured by lions or raped by bulls in the arenas. Their invincible courage and willingness to die, however, eventually won many awed heathens to Christ. Still, these believers were no more or less active in Christian warfare; they simply had, by the grace of God, strategic wisdom to recognize that mere physical violence, far from being excessively aggressive, would not be nearly aggressive enough.
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Violent Christians (In Two Articles)
A friend of mine recently asked what I thought of the idea that Christians should have no involvement in politics or war. Naturally, I thought the best idea would be to write up my arguments in Aquinas' famed format.
Whether Christians ought to hold political office, or in any way concern themselves with temporal civil governments.
It would seem that Christians ought not to involve themselves with temporal government.
Objection I. Christ said that His Kingdom is not of this world, and Paul that our fight is not against the flesh and blood but against the principalities of darkness. Hence it is the Christian's duty to concern himself only with Christ's Kingdom, forgetting the temporal things of this world in order to pursue the work of glorifying God through good works and witnessing.
Objection II. According to the Psalm, we are to put no trust in earthly princes, because all the efforts of the world are futile and passing. It is Christ alone through whom good is done, and no civil effort. Therefore it is a waste of the Christian's time to seek to do good through political means.
Objection III. Although Christ ordained kings and judges to rule over Israel under the Old Testament, in the present age such precedents no longer hold, since the chosen people of God are not of a single race or state.
Objection IV. This is further proved by the Christians of the early Church, who had little to no involvement in the politics or government of the their day, so far as we know, and as they lived soonest after the revelation of Christ through His Apostles, it is reasonable to assume that they had the best idea of what was right.
On the contrary, I answer that it is both lawful and good for Christians to take part in civil government.
However men might have misused the office of kingship, the fact remains that it is an office ordained by God, and hence is sacred. To decry civil authority either as evil or unnecessary is to speak against the God who established it. Civil magistrates are given to us with the purpose of decreeing justice, in the words of the Psalm, to administer the Law of God and promote righteousness. Abusus non tollit usum, abuse does not destroy use. According to opening verses of Romans 13, all power, including civil, is given by God. It is in fact described as a terror to evil. How can it be sinful for Christians to serve in an office divinely appointed to protect righteousness and justice, to be in effect God's governing hand on earth? As C.S. Lewis put it, the Church is the physical organism whereby Christ enacts His purposes on earth. Is it not as much His purpose to maintain justice and preserve His Law as it is to see the Gospel brought to all nations? Put another way, Christians are described as the salt of the earth, that which gives the world its flavor. Reason herself would suggest that we cannot do much by way of flavoring the world if we feel an obligation to drop entirely out of its business.
Furthermore, the whole matter can be handled by a simple reductio ad absurdum. We are commanded to pray for our civil rulers. If it is unlawful for Christians to be civil rulers, then we must choose between one of two practices. Either we must not pray for the salvation of our rulers (because it would then become sinful for them to rule), or we must pray for their salvation, with the additional prayer that they abandon their office when they come to faith. In which case, new leaders would arise in their place, and we would be obligated to pray them out of office as well ad infinitatem. I need hardly point out the absurdity of either.
Reply to Obj. I. Just because Paul said that our fight is not against flesh and blood, it cannot be soundly inferred that he meant that our fight would have nothing to do with it. We are not of the world, but we are in it, and hence it is our battleground. The evils of society that political measures seek to solve come from precisely the same spiritual source as our private selfishness and discontent. That our warfare is spiritual does not mean that it is invisible or metaphorical. Driving sin out of one's own heart is merely a part of the battle; admonishing our friends when they sin, disciplining our children when they sin, enacting laws against evil practices, and punishing those who break them, are simply different tactics in our war to conquer the world for Christ. The Devil is our chief enemy, and he as much displeased to see a righteous ruler deal out justice on a criminal as he is to see him overcoming his own private sins, or witnessing to his neighbor.
Further, which brings more honor and glory to God: for His servants to gather out of sight on the sidelines letting politics and global affairs quite literally go to Hell while they wait for the establishment of the New Heaven and Earth, or for His servants to publicly honor the Law and to the best of their ability uphold justice and promote righteousness in the midst of a world bent on evil and destruction? Which is a clearer manifestation of God's power?
Reply to Obj. II. "By me kings reign, and princes decree justice," says the Psalm. Although earthly means are, in themselves, futile, when blessed by God they are the usual and customary means whereby He enacts His will. It is the same principle that applies to the notion of working to procure food and clothing for ourselves. It is futile to trust in your own work to feed you, but it is wisdom to trust in God to feed you through your work, for it is the means He appointed. The means He has appointed for the preserving of justice on earth is civil government.
Reply to Obj. III. This can quite simply be refuted by pointing to the fact that there is not a passage in the New Testament that abolishes the divine office of king. Although it is clearly stated that the priests, circumcision, and certain other ceremonial of the Old Testament era are no longer needed, likewise that true revelation and prophesy shall cease, nowhere is it stated that civil authority no longer has God's sanction. Christ explicitly states that nothing God established in the earlier days of the Covenant will be removed. Even the old ceremonial laws were not abolished, but rather fulfilled in His sacrifice. There was no need for Christ and the Apostles to reiterate things that had not changed, hence that they do not renounce civil authority as a divine institution, it must be taken to mean that it remains as it was.
Reply to Obj. IV. This argument fails to take into consideration the historical circumstances. Given that the Roman Empire at this time stretched from Britain to the whole of North Africa, and from Spain to Iran, practically all Christians of the primitive Church lived under Roman authority. Under a pagan government generally paranoid about subversion, it is not to be wondered at that Christians took no part in politics. Indeed, they would not have been permitted to, especially since for most of several centuries simply being a Christian was a crime punished by the most hideous forms of executions normally reserved for the murders, rapists, traitors, and the like. What the Christians in these circumstances did cannot be taken as a precedent for all ages. Experience also shows that the early Church was no more immune to false doctrines than the modern, as is evidenced by the many admonitions of Paul against false teachers and doctrines, and the prevalence of heretical teachers such as Marcion, Montanus, Arius, and Valentinus.
Whether Christians ought to hold political office, or in any way concern themselves with temporal civil governments.
It would seem that Christians ought not to involve themselves with temporal government.
Objection I. Christ said that His Kingdom is not of this world, and Paul that our fight is not against the flesh and blood but against the principalities of darkness. Hence it is the Christian's duty to concern himself only with Christ's Kingdom, forgetting the temporal things of this world in order to pursue the work of glorifying God through good works and witnessing.
Objection II. According to the Psalm, we are to put no trust in earthly princes, because all the efforts of the world are futile and passing. It is Christ alone through whom good is done, and no civil effort. Therefore it is a waste of the Christian's time to seek to do good through political means.
Objection III. Although Christ ordained kings and judges to rule over Israel under the Old Testament, in the present age such precedents no longer hold, since the chosen people of God are not of a single race or state.
Objection IV. This is further proved by the Christians of the early Church, who had little to no involvement in the politics or government of the their day, so far as we know, and as they lived soonest after the revelation of Christ through His Apostles, it is reasonable to assume that they had the best idea of what was right.
On the contrary, I answer that it is both lawful and good for Christians to take part in civil government.
However men might have misused the office of kingship, the fact remains that it is an office ordained by God, and hence is sacred. To decry civil authority either as evil or unnecessary is to speak against the God who established it. Civil magistrates are given to us with the purpose of decreeing justice, in the words of the Psalm, to administer the Law of God and promote righteousness. Abusus non tollit usum, abuse does not destroy use. According to opening verses of Romans 13, all power, including civil, is given by God. It is in fact described as a terror to evil. How can it be sinful for Christians to serve in an office divinely appointed to protect righteousness and justice, to be in effect God's governing hand on earth? As C.S. Lewis put it, the Church is the physical organism whereby Christ enacts His purposes on earth. Is it not as much His purpose to maintain justice and preserve His Law as it is to see the Gospel brought to all nations? Put another way, Christians are described as the salt of the earth, that which gives the world its flavor. Reason herself would suggest that we cannot do much by way of flavoring the world if we feel an obligation to drop entirely out of its business.
Furthermore, the whole matter can be handled by a simple reductio ad absurdum. We are commanded to pray for our civil rulers. If it is unlawful for Christians to be civil rulers, then we must choose between one of two practices. Either we must not pray for the salvation of our rulers (because it would then become sinful for them to rule), or we must pray for their salvation, with the additional prayer that they abandon their office when they come to faith. In which case, new leaders would arise in their place, and we would be obligated to pray them out of office as well ad infinitatem. I need hardly point out the absurdity of either.
Reply to Obj. I. Just because Paul said that our fight is not against flesh and blood, it cannot be soundly inferred that he meant that our fight would have nothing to do with it. We are not of the world, but we are in it, and hence it is our battleground. The evils of society that political measures seek to solve come from precisely the same spiritual source as our private selfishness and discontent. That our warfare is spiritual does not mean that it is invisible or metaphorical. Driving sin out of one's own heart is merely a part of the battle; admonishing our friends when they sin, disciplining our children when they sin, enacting laws against evil practices, and punishing those who break them, are simply different tactics in our war to conquer the world for Christ. The Devil is our chief enemy, and he as much displeased to see a righteous ruler deal out justice on a criminal as he is to see him overcoming his own private sins, or witnessing to his neighbor.
Further, which brings more honor and glory to God: for His servants to gather out of sight on the sidelines letting politics and global affairs quite literally go to Hell while they wait for the establishment of the New Heaven and Earth, or for His servants to publicly honor the Law and to the best of their ability uphold justice and promote righteousness in the midst of a world bent on evil and destruction? Which is a clearer manifestation of God's power?
Reply to Obj. II. "By me kings reign, and princes decree justice," says the Psalm. Although earthly means are, in themselves, futile, when blessed by God they are the usual and customary means whereby He enacts His will. It is the same principle that applies to the notion of working to procure food and clothing for ourselves. It is futile to trust in your own work to feed you, but it is wisdom to trust in God to feed you through your work, for it is the means He appointed. The means He has appointed for the preserving of justice on earth is civil government.
Reply to Obj. III. This can quite simply be refuted by pointing to the fact that there is not a passage in the New Testament that abolishes the divine office of king. Although it is clearly stated that the priests, circumcision, and certain other ceremonial of the Old Testament era are no longer needed, likewise that true revelation and prophesy shall cease, nowhere is it stated that civil authority no longer has God's sanction. Christ explicitly states that nothing God established in the earlier days of the Covenant will be removed. Even the old ceremonial laws were not abolished, but rather fulfilled in His sacrifice. There was no need for Christ and the Apostles to reiterate things that had not changed, hence that they do not renounce civil authority as a divine institution, it must be taken to mean that it remains as it was.
Reply to Obj. IV. This argument fails to take into consideration the historical circumstances. Given that the Roman Empire at this time stretched from Britain to the whole of North Africa, and from Spain to Iran, practically all Christians of the primitive Church lived under Roman authority. Under a pagan government generally paranoid about subversion, it is not to be wondered at that Christians took no part in politics. Indeed, they would not have been permitted to, especially since for most of several centuries simply being a Christian was a crime punished by the most hideous forms of executions normally reserved for the murders, rapists, traitors, and the like. What the Christians in these circumstances did cannot be taken as a precedent for all ages. Experience also shows that the early Church was no more immune to false doctrines than the modern, as is evidenced by the many admonitions of Paul against false teachers and doctrines, and the prevalence of heretical teachers such as Marcion, Montanus, Arius, and Valentinus.
Monday, January 5, 2009
The War: Part I: History of the Issue
This passage is the opening portion of my research paper on the future of the War on Terror. Following instalments will appear as written.
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As we prepare to enter 2009, it is perhaps safe to say that no single event has held American attention for the past eight years more than the so-called War on Terror. Like the Cold War of the last generation, it is the ongoing occurrence that leaves no corner of the geopolitical picture uncolored. Terrorism is the new broad brush with which American enemies are painted, Beowulf’s dragon come in place of the old monsters. Like Communism, the term is so often encountered in the media and even in day to day conversation that it is easy to use without actually understanding what it means. And like the Cold War, the term War on Terror does not even begin to describe the real state of affairs. The parallels do not end there.
This much—with the possible exception of the final sentence—most who are educated on the issue would agree on. But beyond that, it is probably impossible to find any two identical opinions on the subject of American troops embattled in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria. Even more varied are the views on what is to be done with other nations with whom there is no open conflict, such as North Korea—a nation with whom the United States has been unofficially at war for fifty-eight years (Blair 976)—and Iran—a nation which has considered itself at war with the United States for thirty years (Leeden)—as well as those not directly threatening but containing factions sympathetic to the enemy, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Lebanon.
One question particularly pertinent as the United States enters a new administration is just how this war can and should be fought. Are the conventional tactics of land warfare, such as were employed in Iraq from 2003, a viable precedent for future battles? Inextricably linked to this issue is the question of whether or not the enemy can be tied to any nation or nations, and hence whether or not warfare confined by political borders can defeat him. From Stratfor to the Iraq Study Group, generals to historians and journalists, thousands of voices have been raised in answer.
Of these, most, though by no means all, have opposed the idea that prolonged ground warfare will have any lasting efficacy. Early analyses were relatively positive, however, even as late as 2004. Several voices, such as Stratfor’s founder George Friedman, argued that not only did the commitment to a large scale ground war demonstrate just how serious the United States was about combating terrorism, but also that its strategy is succeeding on most levels. “The goal of Al Qaeda was a rising of the Islamic masses that would topple Islamic regimes, replacing them with ones that would take their bearings from Al Qaeda’s thinking. Not a single regime fell to Al Qaeda…Quite to the contrary, the United States was extremely effective in reshaping the behavior of Islamic regimes. Virtually all Islamic regimes changed their behavior to accommodate American demands that they block support for Al Qaeda…” (332). The potential for failure, argues Friedman, lies not in U.S. operational ineffectiveness or impotence, but rather in “the vast distance that separates American leaders from those who fight” (339). Were this distance to be breached and the present strategy rigorously pursued, the War on Terror could end in victory for the United States.
Many reports, however, were less optimistic. The Iraq Study Group Report, compiled by a diverse and experienced panel including former Secretaries of State James A. Baker and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Congressman Leon E. Panetta, and former Congressman, Marine, and current Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board member, Charles S. Robb, was published in late 2006 and is one of the most widely publicized documents to be written on the Iraq War. Its members reached the controversial conclusion that the United States’ policy in Iraq was inherently flawed and doomed to failure (9). According to the report, “violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality,” as a result of the U.S. conventional ground war (10); moreover the majority of that violence is committed by Sunni Arabs: “Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters—numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq” (10). The nature of such a fruitless ground war means that “extraordinary sacrifices” are expected of American forces, who are under “significant strain” (12). The report also argues that the situation cannot improve without a change of course because the Iraqi soldiers—who are vital to the purported U.S. goal of establishing a stable nation in Iraq (12)—are ill equipped to carry out their mission (13), and that the political climate is adverse to a unified Iraqi national goal (17-19). Although the report allows that there are some encouraging signs, for instance that “[t]here has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous potential for growth,” on the other hand “economic development is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated infrastructure, and uncertainty.” Moreover, the regional international assistance to the country has been slight and generally insignificant (24-27).
The only way forward, the Group argues, is to begin a “Diplomatic Offensive,” whose primary objective would be to gain international support among Iraq’s neighbors (32-41), to shift primary responsibility from U.S. to Iraqi shoulders by focusing on providing them with the means to rebuild, rather than on rebuilding for them (41). If this plan had been implemented late in 2006, the report maintains, Iraqi forces could have been self-reliant by December of 2007 (44). In short a traditional martial focus is not a realistic modus operandi given the peculiar circumstances of Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, as well as the nature of the enemy.
The publication of this document raised a substantial stir, and many of its arguments have been countered in subsequent publications. Some held that many of its claims, particularly its recommendations, were unrealistic. Bruce Riedel, former advisor not only to Presidents Clinton and George H.W. Bush but also to NATO on Middle Eastern matters, concluded that a diplomatic offensive as opposed to strictly military one has little hope of success. “It’s simply a matter that the Shia and Kurdish and Sunni political leaders of Iraq don’t have a great deal of loyalty to the notion of an Iraq nation. That loyalty was broken apart during the Saddam regime and it has not been put back together. In fact, the democratic process has in some ways fueled the sectarian and ethnic divisions of the country.” The possibility of consensus among Iraq’s neighbors was likewise called into question. “Each of Iraq’s neighbors has a different agenda and a different vision of its future. Those agendas do not match up nicely. And it’s not likely that they’re going to be able to agree on how they want the future of Iraq developed” (Riedel). Others argued that the Study Group had underestimated the role played by Al-Qaeda and its allies in Iraq, and that a war in that country was necessary. (Hayes) Many alleged that the difficulties in Iraq were born not of flawed strategy but rather of insufficient manpower to carry it out against an indigenous and highly mobile enemy (Riedel). This view, shared by President George W. Bush, led to a rapid and substantial increase in the number of U.S. troops to the country, popularly known as the “Troop Surge,” in 2007. Whether or not this measure was successful, either in the short term or in the long, remains debated, some saying that it was an effective measure that had greatly increased the situation (Campell and O’Hanlon), while others countered that the benefits were short term and the damage would be long term (Simon).
An important and inevitable offshoot of this debate is the question of precisely where the Iraq War method should or should not be seen as a viable precedent. When, if ever, Iraq is secured, in which direction should the next step be taken? To Michael Leeden, former national security advisor to the Departments of Defense and State, the obvious answer is just across the eastern border. “The bottom line is that Iran is our principal enemy in the Middle East, and perhaps in the entire world… Our choices with regard to Iran are to challenge them directly and win this war now, to do so only after they kill a lot more of us in some kind of attack, or to surrender” (Leeden). He asserts that Iran not only has declared itself an enemy of the U.S., but also that recent events have shown how ill-prepared it truly is to fight. To others, notably President-elect Barrack Obama, Iran is a secondary concern to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the latter long known to be an al-Qaeda stomping ground and the scene of much recent violence and unrest (Baldwin). Few, however, clearly define precisely how Iran or Pakistan are to be dealt with, whether by conventional ground warfare or by some other means. Perhaps that can only be addressed when the first question about Iraq is duly answered.
--------------
Works Cited
Baldwin, Thomas. “Obama Willing to Invade Pakistan in al-Qaeda Hunt.” The Times Online. 2 Aug. 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article2182955.ece
Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
Campbell, Jason H., and O’Hanlon, Michael E. “The State of Iraq: An Update.” Brookings Institution. 22 Dec 2007. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1222_iraq_ohanlon.aspx
Friedman, George. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and its Enemies. New York: Doubleday, 2004.
Hayes, Stephen F. “Saddam's Iraq and Islamic Terrorism: What We Now Know.” Imprimis. Dec. 2006. http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2006&month=12
Iraq Study Group. The Iraq Study Group Report. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
Leeden, Michael. “Understanding Iran.” Imprimis. Oct. 2008. http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2008&month=10
O’Hanlon, Michael E., Pollack, Kenneth M., and Riedel, Bruce. An Analysis of The Iraq Study Group Report. Proc. of Brooking Institution Conf., 7 Dec, 2006.
Simon, Steven. “The Price of the Surge.” Foreign Affairs. May 2008 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we prepare to enter 2009, it is perhaps safe to say that no single event has held American attention for the past eight years more than the so-called War on Terror. Like the Cold War of the last generation, it is the ongoing occurrence that leaves no corner of the geopolitical picture uncolored. Terrorism is the new broad brush with which American enemies are painted, Beowulf’s dragon come in place of the old monsters. Like Communism, the term is so often encountered in the media and even in day to day conversation that it is easy to use without actually understanding what it means. And like the Cold War, the term War on Terror does not even begin to describe the real state of affairs. The parallels do not end there.
This much—with the possible exception of the final sentence—most who are educated on the issue would agree on. But beyond that, it is probably impossible to find any two identical opinions on the subject of American troops embattled in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria. Even more varied are the views on what is to be done with other nations with whom there is no open conflict, such as North Korea—a nation with whom the United States has been unofficially at war for fifty-eight years (Blair 976)—and Iran—a nation which has considered itself at war with the United States for thirty years (Leeden)—as well as those not directly threatening but containing factions sympathetic to the enemy, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Lebanon.
One question particularly pertinent as the United States enters a new administration is just how this war can and should be fought. Are the conventional tactics of land warfare, such as were employed in Iraq from 2003, a viable precedent for future battles? Inextricably linked to this issue is the question of whether or not the enemy can be tied to any nation or nations, and hence whether or not warfare confined by political borders can defeat him. From Stratfor to the Iraq Study Group, generals to historians and journalists, thousands of voices have been raised in answer.
Of these, most, though by no means all, have opposed the idea that prolonged ground warfare will have any lasting efficacy. Early analyses were relatively positive, however, even as late as 2004. Several voices, such as Stratfor’s founder George Friedman, argued that not only did the commitment to a large scale ground war demonstrate just how serious the United States was about combating terrorism, but also that its strategy is succeeding on most levels. “The goal of Al Qaeda was a rising of the Islamic masses that would topple Islamic regimes, replacing them with ones that would take their bearings from Al Qaeda’s thinking. Not a single regime fell to Al Qaeda…Quite to the contrary, the United States was extremely effective in reshaping the behavior of Islamic regimes. Virtually all Islamic regimes changed their behavior to accommodate American demands that they block support for Al Qaeda…” (332). The potential for failure, argues Friedman, lies not in U.S. operational ineffectiveness or impotence, but rather in “the vast distance that separates American leaders from those who fight” (339). Were this distance to be breached and the present strategy rigorously pursued, the War on Terror could end in victory for the United States.
Many reports, however, were less optimistic. The Iraq Study Group Report, compiled by a diverse and experienced panel including former Secretaries of State James A. Baker and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Congressman Leon E. Panetta, and former Congressman, Marine, and current Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board member, Charles S. Robb, was published in late 2006 and is one of the most widely publicized documents to be written on the Iraq War. Its members reached the controversial conclusion that the United States’ policy in Iraq was inherently flawed and doomed to failure (9). According to the report, “violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality,” as a result of the U.S. conventional ground war (10); moreover the majority of that violence is committed by Sunni Arabs: “Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters—numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq” (10). The nature of such a fruitless ground war means that “extraordinary sacrifices” are expected of American forces, who are under “significant strain” (12). The report also argues that the situation cannot improve without a change of course because the Iraqi soldiers—who are vital to the purported U.S. goal of establishing a stable nation in Iraq (12)—are ill equipped to carry out their mission (13), and that the political climate is adverse to a unified Iraqi national goal (17-19). Although the report allows that there are some encouraging signs, for instance that “[t]here has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous potential for growth,” on the other hand “economic development is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated infrastructure, and uncertainty.” Moreover, the regional international assistance to the country has been slight and generally insignificant (24-27).
The only way forward, the Group argues, is to begin a “Diplomatic Offensive,” whose primary objective would be to gain international support among Iraq’s neighbors (32-41), to shift primary responsibility from U.S. to Iraqi shoulders by focusing on providing them with the means to rebuild, rather than on rebuilding for them (41). If this plan had been implemented late in 2006, the report maintains, Iraqi forces could have been self-reliant by December of 2007 (44). In short a traditional martial focus is not a realistic modus operandi given the peculiar circumstances of Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, as well as the nature of the enemy.
The publication of this document raised a substantial stir, and many of its arguments have been countered in subsequent publications. Some held that many of its claims, particularly its recommendations, were unrealistic. Bruce Riedel, former advisor not only to Presidents Clinton and George H.W. Bush but also to NATO on Middle Eastern matters, concluded that a diplomatic offensive as opposed to strictly military one has little hope of success. “It’s simply a matter that the Shia and Kurdish and Sunni political leaders of Iraq don’t have a great deal of loyalty to the notion of an Iraq nation. That loyalty was broken apart during the Saddam regime and it has not been put back together. In fact, the democratic process has in some ways fueled the sectarian and ethnic divisions of the country.” The possibility of consensus among Iraq’s neighbors was likewise called into question. “Each of Iraq’s neighbors has a different agenda and a different vision of its future. Those agendas do not match up nicely. And it’s not likely that they’re going to be able to agree on how they want the future of Iraq developed” (Riedel). Others argued that the Study Group had underestimated the role played by Al-Qaeda and its allies in Iraq, and that a war in that country was necessary. (Hayes) Many alleged that the difficulties in Iraq were born not of flawed strategy but rather of insufficient manpower to carry it out against an indigenous and highly mobile enemy (Riedel). This view, shared by President George W. Bush, led to a rapid and substantial increase in the number of U.S. troops to the country, popularly known as the “Troop Surge,” in 2007. Whether or not this measure was successful, either in the short term or in the long, remains debated, some saying that it was an effective measure that had greatly increased the situation (Campell and O’Hanlon), while others countered that the benefits were short term and the damage would be long term (Simon).
An important and inevitable offshoot of this debate is the question of precisely where the Iraq War method should or should not be seen as a viable precedent. When, if ever, Iraq is secured, in which direction should the next step be taken? To Michael Leeden, former national security advisor to the Departments of Defense and State, the obvious answer is just across the eastern border. “The bottom line is that Iran is our principal enemy in the Middle East, and perhaps in the entire world… Our choices with regard to Iran are to challenge them directly and win this war now, to do so only after they kill a lot more of us in some kind of attack, or to surrender” (Leeden). He asserts that Iran not only has declared itself an enemy of the U.S., but also that recent events have shown how ill-prepared it truly is to fight. To others, notably President-elect Barrack Obama, Iran is a secondary concern to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the latter long known to be an al-Qaeda stomping ground and the scene of much recent violence and unrest (Baldwin). Few, however, clearly define precisely how Iran or Pakistan are to be dealt with, whether by conventional ground warfare or by some other means. Perhaps that can only be addressed when the first question about Iraq is duly answered.
--------------
Works Cited
Baldwin, Thomas. “Obama Willing to Invade Pakistan in al-Qaeda Hunt.” The Times Online. 2 Aug. 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article2182955.ece
Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
Campbell, Jason H., and O’Hanlon, Michael E. “The State of Iraq: An Update.” Brookings Institution. 22 Dec 2007. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1222_iraq_ohanlon.aspx
Friedman, George. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and its Enemies. New York: Doubleday, 2004.
Hayes, Stephen F. “Saddam's Iraq and Islamic Terrorism: What We Now Know.” Imprimis. Dec. 2006. http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2006&month=12
Iraq Study Group. The Iraq Study Group Report. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
Leeden, Michael. “Understanding Iran.” Imprimis. Oct. 2008. http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2008&month=10
O’Hanlon, Michael E., Pollack, Kenneth M., and Riedel, Bruce. An Analysis of The Iraq Study Group Report. Proc. of Brooking Institution Conf., 7 Dec, 2006.
Simon, Steven. “The Price of the Surge.” Foreign Affairs. May 2008 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html
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